My friend and comrade Liz Thompson (yes, I actually talk that way and mean it) met up with Leila Khaled in Nairobi this January. Below is the text of the short interview that resulted.

The interview reveals something of the situation amongst the Palestinian factions at that time, but I think, not surprisingly, reveals as much or more about how the PFLP leadership wished to present that situation. This, I would suggest, gives further indication of, and fits in general with, the way that the PFLP is positioning itself politically in the ongoing crisis.

Obviously a lot has changed things since this interview took place. To barely scratch the surface: Palestinian efforts at ‘national unity’ government; US playing footsie with the Abbas faction of Fatah, probably encouraging a coup attempt against Hamas; Hamas’ widely-denounced, eventual violent takeover of Gaza, leaving Fatah with the West Bank and the territories politically, geograpically and militarily divided into prison-ghettos.

In other words, accurate or not, the moment described by this interview is over. A new situation has to be faced.

Leila Khaled, speaking at the recent World Social Forum in Nairobi, was described by the chair of a panel as a “symbol” of Palestinian resistance. Indeed, the image of Leila Khaled posing with an automatic weapon and wearing a ring fashioned from a bullet and the pin of a hand grenade, readying herself for yet another plane hijacking is, along with Albert Kodera’s over-exploited image of Che Guevara, and the wanted posters of Angela Davis, a defining image of the 60s and 70s liberation struggles, when oppressed nations and groups using armed struggle as a path to liberation made significant gains with support and solidarity (military, financial, political) from comrades around the world.

But Leila Khaled is much more than a symbol. She is a continuing and active member of the Palestinian National Council, the Legislative Council - General Union of Palestinian Women and is a member of the Central Committee of the Marxist national liberation organisation, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP).

I met Leila Khaled at the World Social Forum in Nairobi and talked to her about the PFLP, the recent elections, the unity government and the media frenzy over the alleged impending civil war in the Palestinian territories.

I also asked her for an update on the situation of the Jericho prisoners - Palestinian prisoners kidnapped from a prison in Jericho by Israeli soldiers and taken to Israel in 2006, with the collusion of the US and the UK.

1 - Leila Khaled, could you explain to us the history and platform of the PFLP?

The PFLP was established after the occupation of the Gaza Strip and the West Bank in 1967. The PFLP declared itself on December 11th of that year. It adopted Marxism as its ideology and from this an extensive strategic program. Its object is to establish one democratic state for Jews and Arabs. The key solution is the return of the Palestinians according to UN resolution 194 [passed on 11th December 1948]. This resolution was a condition for the recognition of Israel. But according to the balance of forces at the time, Israel was recognised though the Palestinians were not allowed to return. Ours is a stageist solution. At the PLO, all factions accepted the Right of Return, self-determination and the establishment of an independent Palestinian state with Jerusalem as its capital, as a step towards the eventual creation of one democratic state. The main strategy is armed struggle. Our enemies are the imperial powers, the Zionist movement and Israel. We see ourselves as part of the Arab liberation and international liberation struggles. We are part of the anti-globalisation and anti-imperialist movements.

2 - The PFLP is secular, and advocates class struggle as part of its platform. What then is its relationship to Hamas, the Islamic movement, and has this relationship changed from the first intifada until now?

Hamas emerged in 1988. It has its religious ideology. As long as we agree that we are in a stage if the struggle, we should be in one front, with a minimum platform of Right of Return and a two-state solution. Now Hamas agrees with this. At first, they called for an Islamic state. Now, they have accepted the stageist strategy. They are part of the resistance. Now is not the time to discuss ideological differences with them. We have good relations with not only Hamas, but Al-Jihad.

3 - The PFLP won a number of seats in the recent election in ? Is the organisation pleased with the result? Is this reflective of the level of support for the PFLP in Palestine?

We respect our people’s choice. This choice is for Hamas. We have retreated. This shows that the left groups must reorganise themselves. As the left, as the PFLP, we have contributed, we have martyrs, including Ali Mustafa [assassinated by Israeli security force in August 2001], and now our leader has been taken from Jericho [Ahmed Saadat, abducted by Israeli soldiers from Jericho prison on 14th March 2006]. But we look forward, to show the difference between Hamas and Fatah and the PFLP. In our society religion is a big influence. And after Oslo, we found that Fatah was not bringing our rights. After this, our people chose Hamas for this to change. It is time now for programs to raise awareness amongst our masses.

4 - Could you give us an update on the current status of the Jericho abductees?

Our General-Secretary, Ahmad Saadat, was kidnapped with four others: Majid al-Rimawi, Hamdi Qar’an, Ahed Abu Ghalmiyeh and Basel al-Asma. Sa’adat refused to recognise the court in Israel. They brought him to the court by force. He said to the court that it should be sued for kidnap of him, and for occcupation. He knows he can’t get a fair trial. It has been postponed until April. Until now, there is still no sentence for him or the others.

5 - The PFLP is a national liberation organisation. Where does the class struggle fit within this perspective, and how does the PFLP view national structures like the Palestinian Authority?

Class conflict in our situation lies in the conflict between the Palestinian Authority and the masses. The question is how to take leadership - this is our vision of the class conflict. In Palestine, the working-class has been destroyed, and peasants have been forced off the land because of high taxes and other things. All classes are impacted negatively. We try to mobilise the working-class and the peasants even though the class in not constituted or cohered in the classical way. Also, we try to mobilise the refugees. The main mission is to mobilise all the people.

During the first intifada, all classes in Palestine were involved, so we could not raise class as an issue.

After Oslo, the class conflict has come up because of the Palestinian Authority. The petit bourgeois is represented by Fatah. This is the class conflict in our political view.

Internationally, the collapse of the Eastern European communist countries as a contradictory pole has affected the working-class all over the world. The working-class has been bribed with privilege also, and this is why class conflict in industrial countries has weakened.

The anti-globalisation movement has emerged. This is also a class movement: poor against rich, south against north. Before, it was the working-class in each country against its own bourgeoisie. Now it has become more international, to face the atrocities of globalisation.

6 - How does the PFLP organise amongst the population in the West Bank, Gaza Strip, or in the Palestinian population centres outside Palestine?

At the beginning of the revolution, there was only Fatah and the PFLP. Most people were enthusiastic, coming to military camps to have training. Our structure has categories: workers; teachers; women; intellectuals; youth.

Inside Palestine we have popular women’s committees in the Gaza Strip and West Bank, we have the Progressive Action Front for youth and students, and we also have specialised institutions, such as the Union of Health Committees and Agriculture Committees. We also have institutions for prisoners and their families. There are 2 levels - categories of society as well as service organisations. They are working in both the West Bank and Gaza Strip. The Progressive Action Front operates in most universities in Palestine, as well as in many other countries.

7 - The strategy of the Israeli state in relation to Hamas and Fatah seems to be designed to foment civil war in the Palestinian territories. Indeed, “imminent civil war” is the line being run in the Western media, along with images of Fatah and Hamas militants exchanging gun-fire in the streets of Palestine. How is the general population responding to the armed clashes between factions, and what role or action has the PFLP taken in response to this crisis?

Our people have a culture of resistance since before 1948. Any clashes are condemned by the people. This is excluded totally. We have always agreed that we will settle our differences with dialogue. Arms are for resistance to occupation, not for using against each other. This is the first time we have faced this situation. In any family in Palestine, you can find 3 brothers, all in different factions. Whatever strategy the Israelis use will not work in this regard. The PFLP has played a role mobilising the people against the clashes. Also, we are regularly talking with both sides.We condemned any actions that led to kidnapping or killing.

There is a committee from all factions beside the government in the Gaza Strip to discuss inter-factional matters. This committee has all factions represented and has been very successful. We go to this committee to go to Hamas and Fatah and talk with them.

8 - You have stated here at a plenary of the World Social Forum [”Memories of Struggle, alongside the Mau Mau rebels, Nelson Mandela, etc] that you no longer see the strategy of plane hijackings as politically useful. Can you explain the PFLP’s assassination strategy in light of this and the PFLP’s stated committment to popular struggle?

No, no. This assassination is not a strategy. These are tactics that we use. This is legal and armed struggle in legal in the international community. Israel has the strategy of assassination - Yassin, Rantisi, Ali Mustafa (?), they have assassinated many political activists! Now they have kidnapped the Speaker of the Legislative Assembly and the deputies. Israel always declares that this is a strategy, this assassination. Once we have assassinated [in October 2001, the PFLP assassinated Israeli Tourism Minister in revenge for the assassination of then-PFLP General Secretary Abu Ali Mustafa in August 2001] We attack soldiers and settlers only.

9 - What is your opinion on the proposal for a unity government in Palestine - or even fresh elections? What is the PFLP’s position? Will the PFLP participate in new elections?

I don’t think there will be fresh elections. There is dialogue for the formation of a unity government. We declared that we are against fresh elections because these elections would be for the Israelis. We are under sanctions because of the election of Hamas. I hope that we soon reach a decision on a unity government where this government can take things forward.

What about the PFLP’s seats?

The important thing is to have the unity government! We have agreed upon a political document 4 months ago - whoever is the government, it is important that they carry this out. We are keen on a unity government first, social programs second, and then last who gets what seats. This last point is not so important to us.

10 - You have said here at the WSF [at a session run by the Frantz Fanon group on 23rd Jan 2007, on “Middle East wars”] that “reactionary violence must be met by revolutionary violence”. In Australia there is significant debate over violent or non-violent methods of struggle, and whether it is ever appropriate to use violence against the state except in a situation of immediate self-defence. Could you comment on this?

It is different. Occupation is terror. There is an apartheid regime. Resistance is legalised by international law.

In our history, we have tried both negotiations and armed struggle. We can use both violence and non-violence. We can use political methods.

Any people like the Palestinians who have been suffering for a long time - we don’t like bloodshed. It is not possible to use non-violence. In Beit Hanoun last month for example [siege and attack on Beit Hanoun mosque in December 2006]. You can’t face the Apaches and the tanks with roses.

The lesson in Lebanon is that Hizbullah defeated Israel by violent armed resistance. It is our right to resist. It is our duty to resist and to use this form of struggle. People wanting freedom must not ask but take. We must oblige our enemies to accept or recognise our rights. We get this not by begging but by hitting on the head.

Apart from the inherent interest of this interview with Khaled, I would like to use it as an opportunity to more-or-less crudely reiterate my view of the ‘Israel-Palestine conflict’.

The election of Hamas, like suicide bombings, provided another pretext for the Israeli government to impose more misery on the Palestinians in what used to be called the Occupied Territories. As with the Apartheid Fence, I would argue that the Israeli boycott of the territories and refusal to hand over Palestinian taxes to the Palestinian Authority should be seen as part of the strategy of misery, the goal of which is the destruction of Palestinian society. The racialised politics of Israel positions the existence of these Palestinians as a problem. The Israeli state doesn’t really want “peace”, even a “peace” founded on subcontracting some compliant wing of Fatah to manage the containment of bantustans under a pretend state with less authority than the Moreland City Council. Whether Israel prefers Fatah or Hamas to occupy positions of management of the territories, or both dividing the territories up even further, is largely a judgement, I’d suggest, about which will help destroy Palestinian society more effectively. As such I’m sure there are many debates about Israeli tactics in relation to that question, but I see little real evidence of serious disagreement concerning what is barely euphemised as “the demographic problem”, the term routinely deployed in public discussion to refer to the desire that the Jewish State innoculate itself from the perceived and real threats of the existence of too many Arabs.

In this context Israel wants a stable PA about as much as it wants a final agreement in good faith leading to peace. The efforts at political negotiation by Palestinian factions, and the possibility of any meaningful “national unity” organised between them, represented only risks, not opportunities.

There is no solution for the Palestinian population as a whole in such unity, but the dull, daily imperative to survive and struggle in the face of Israel’s constant destructive efforts does not diappear because “national liberation” turns out to be a bourgeois mirage.