taking pleasure in our diseases
notes, bits thrown out of early drafts
In the very early twenty-first century, settler-colonial states such as South Africa, Israel and Australia, have still found themselves managing the consequences and continuations of their foundations: aggressive invasions, domination and displacements accompanied by discourses of racial purity. OK, religious and/or racial purity.
While settler-colonial states can enact a politics which declares that the indigenous inhabitants do not exist, or are not people, the problem that is survival remains. Indigenous peoples have neither been killed or exiled, nor been dispersed and integrated, out of existence.
These states of necessity face the indigenous question, the problem of the survival of prior inhabitants. Borders can be erected against the foreign and the impure, and libidinally invested with fantasies of domestic purity, but the indigenous, always-already present, generally find that colonial nation-building entails the formation of numerous internal borders, defining areas of concentration and exclusion, citizenship and its others, relations of command and of ownership.
At first glance the centrality of this question for the reproduction of particular states can crudely appear as if it is in a direct and inverse relationship to the asymptotically complete extermination or exile of Indigenous populations, but more particularly it is a problem of survival and development: the survival and persistence of forms of life in contradiction to the system of social relations upon whose reproduction and expansion the state depends, and the development of political cultures and cultural politics which arise from the struggles and resistances of Indigenous peoples.
white identity politicians
Colonisation is warfare, remaking political geography in the extension of empire or the foundation of new states. As the political form of a settler-colony, founded by the British Empire in violent expropriation from those who had lived there for thousands of years, the colonial Australian state was both. This state has always been the continuation of this colonial warfare by political means, which entails the management of its consequences.
This state and public political discourse have long evinced anxieties about territorial borders and the boundaries of citizenship – concepts, of course, which have never been coterminous. From the beginning the Australian Labor Party declared its commitment to a racially pure nation. The Australian constitution explicitly authorises the institutionalisation of racial discrimination, justified at the time of its creation in terms of white racial hegemony. From that time, through the long period of the now officially repudiated White Australia policy, through waves of mass migration and the eventual promulgation of ‘multiculturalism’ as a state-sponsored discourse of national ethnic harmony and a strategy for the state management of difference, through to the creation in Australia of the world’s first privately-owned, user-pays concentration camps known as “immigration detention centres”, these anxieties have been continually mobilized and instrumentalised.
Along with anxieties over the fixing and policing of borders and citizenship comes the inverse anxiety about, and defensive assertions of, the content of this defended ‘Australian-ness’, whether seen as essentially ‘white’ or ‘Anglo’ or as ‘multicultural’ – or, in various senses, as both. The question of ‘Australian identity’ posed as a question of identity or ‘values’, framed without explicit reference to race or ethnicity, but nonetheless national and no less racialised. Indeed, ‘white’ is still seen as outside of ethnicity, as external the multicultural concept of ‘culture’, thus dividing citizens into distinct if de facto categories. Thus, to repeat an example, the Law Council of Australia, in its Senate submission on the Crimes Amendment (Bail and Sentencing) Bill 2006, continually and somewhat comically distinguished between “people of multicultural backgrounds” and others.
In the context of Australia’s “war on terror”, waged against enemies assumed to be Islamic, these fictitious “values” have been redeployed as that which national enemies are said to lack, whether they are in Australian territory or not, whether they are citizens or not. Though the shift to ever-harsher border control regimes pre-dates the officially-declared “war on terror”, the discourses and practices of both have considerable overlap and have intertwined and reshaped Australian politics and society, as both seek new forms of surveillance and control over mobility and deploy narcissistic cliches as the content of their appeals to nationalism.
This new competitive cretinisation of political performance, tied to rhetorics of nation, of borders and security, was evident, for example, in the ongoing exchange between government and opposition in 2006, after the Liberal government declared that all prospective migrants should be required to commit to a list of governmentally-determined “Australian values”. The opposition agreed but extended this principle: all visitors to Australia, every person applying for a visa, would have to “sign off” on the ALP’s designation of “Aussie values”:
• Respect for Australia’s institutions, including its democracy, laws, courts, parliaments, armed forces and police.
• Respect for different religions and cultures, for the equal treatment of women, and for hard work.
So the “equal treatment of women”, absurdly proclaimed as an essential Aussie value, has become available to even the most reactionary anti-feminist as an asserted distinction between civilised and uncivilised people, a distinction then equally absurdly collapsed into categories of friend and enemy. The purpose includes a not very subtle demonstration of hostility to Muslims as they have come to be represented.
The intersection of border control, xenophobia, and the patriotism of “Aussie values” can be most neatly exemplified, perhaps, by the title some wished to give to these new requirements, metonymically derived from the proliferation of Australia’s most banal figure of nationalism: the ‘mateship visa’. This kind of fantasy politics is pure propaganda, in that the proposals were unlikely to meaningfully impact on anything: they simply act to promote the compulsory racism of the moment, presenting a somewhat ridiculous image in which we are invited to see ourselves, if we are the appropriate recipient.
More recent fantasies, such as those about all those scarily violent anti-APEC protesters, are likely to have much more immediate and themselves scary consequences, as protesters are more-or-less condemned for lacking that very “respect for Australia’s institutions, including its democracy, laws, courts, parliaments, armed forces and police.” which the Opposition leader so wanted visa applicants to have to ritually affirm. But if it is a competition, I think neither are as significant or as dreadful as the ‘intervention’ into the lives of Indigenous people in the Northern Territory - in any case all three illustrate overlapping tendencies making up this violent democracy.
This suspicion of the foreigner always includes suspicion of the foreigner within, and a call for people to enjoy the new racisms and identifications with violent authority decorating this barren lunar landscape.
